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Europe and Education
Harmonisation versus competition
Ulrich van Lith
Paper presented at the conference 
”Liberal Education – International Perspectives” organised 
by the Liberal Institute of the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung,
Potsdam 2-4. September 2005.
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We need competing education and training systems to make the Member 
States strong, and to European capital market for investment in human 
capital to make Europe competitive and grow together
Ulrich van Lith
Introduction: The individual as owner  
of knowledge, skills and competencies
It is the individual person who invests in his/her education and training, it is he 
or she who decides to use or not to use the knowledge, skills and competencies 
acquired. He or she also decides when and how to use them. He or she gets the 
beneﬁts of his/her education, but also has to bear the costs and to take the risks 
of false investment in time, effort and money spent on education. Since we have 
good reasons to believe that the individual knows best what he can, what his po-
tentials are, what he/she should learn and how he or she can make the best use of 
knowledge and skills acquired, he/she normally cannot be forced to be educated 
and trained in a special way or to be forced to make use of what he or she has 
learnt. Such compulsory action would be inefﬁcient.
Difﬁculties individuals have to ﬁnance 
their education and training
For this reason, individuals (students, trainees) and their families who do not have 
the money to be educated or trained could have difﬁculties to get this money from 
a private bank, with the exception, they can offer a collateral or a guarantee that 
someone else will pay the money back, if he or she is unable to do so. This is one 
of the main reasons why schools and universities in Europe are nowadays mainly 
ﬁnanced by the state. Knowing about the importance of education and training 
and their growing importance in a globalising and rapidly changing economy, we 
do not want that individuals and young citizens are either unable to pay for their 
education or  start their professional career with high amounts of individual debts. 
We do not want the ﬁrst, because the individual would suffer a loss in welfare 
and personal fulﬁlment when he or she cannot make the best of his or her natural 
endowments and also, because other members of our society loose welfare, since 
the individual cannot offer his/her qualiﬁed services to them. Finally, we all, Eu-
rope as a whole, would loose if this would happen too often. We would loose our 
competitiveness and, after some time, even social cohesion and peace. 
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The characteristics of European education systems:
institutional unity of ﬁnance, production 
and control of education
The problem, however, is that most of the systems of public ﬁnancing of education 
in Europe have characteristics that generally increase the demand for (school-
based) education and training above an efﬁcient level and distort its structure, 
because the individual himself does neither know what the teaching and training 
services cost he receives nor does he have to bear these costs individually.1 They 
are not an item of his personal cost-beneﬁt-estimate. His behaviour is more like 
someone who has only to bear the costs of his personal effort and time spent on 
education or the lost alternative use of both. The second point is, teachers and 
teachers‘ unions are interested in increasing the education supply and can more 
easily raise wages above those of competitive markets. The third point is that ﬁ-
nancing of education and provision of education are mixed up.2 Mostly the nation 
state itself provides education and ﬁnances it institutionally. In sum, this crea-
tes problems of monopoly power, deﬁciencies in incentives to detect the natural 
gifts and potentials of individuals, to identify the changing as well as the rela-
tive stable demands for special and basic skills and competencies and to match 
both cost-effectively by screening and educational programmes and training. It 
strengthens teachers‘ union power and forms state and teachers into one insti-
tution which ﬁnances, produces and controls education and is highly efﬁcient in 
protecting itself against competition from outside, be it private or international. 
Co-determination of parents and students is for several reasons not effective to 
destroy this monopoly.3 Thus, the production of information about gifted indi-
viduals, required basic attitudes and key qualiﬁcations, about expert knowledge 
and skills needed, about cost-minimising solutions in the production process of 
multiple educational goods is reduced, the ﬂexibility and innovational power of 
the education system and its parts lowered.
The potential role of the European Union
This is the point where the European Union, the Commission, could come in to 
ﬁnd its productive and value adding role: not to harmonise, not to reduce the 
competency of national governments or to distribute still more money through 
education programmes or a European Educational Opportunity Bank. Though the 
latter might produce additional value to the Community as a whole and to its 
members when it is an independent body. Instead, the main point is to show what 
national governments and their citizens and taxpayers will gain, if they allow their 
education systems and parts of them (educational tracks, schools, faculties and 
universities, training companies) to compete freely for individual European citi-
zens what ever their nationality may be. The political philosophy, the guideline 
must be to put them into competition for the best of those who want to learn, to 
be educated, to be trained and retrained. 
The costs of educational protectionism and the 
gains of an open education and training market
Practically speaking, the ﬁrst step would be that the European Union4, the Com-
mission, shows what national governments, taxpayers and, last but not least, the 
individual student or trainee will gain through open competing education systems. 
It has to demonstrate what gains can be achieved through productivity increases 
and reduction of costs, through better education decision-relevant (ex ante) in-
formation available to parents, students, trainees, employers, schools and univer-
sities, through increased ﬂexibility and innovation and, ﬁnally, through a better 
matching of produced competencies and their demand on labour markets.
It must be shown that a European Education Market does not only give a chance 
to those who can pay for their education and training abroad - in addition to taxes 
paid at home -, and reduce the others to the chance of the very limited number of 
students and trainees who are ‚exchanged‘ across national borders as goods are 
exchanged when there is no money. It means to enable students and trainees to 
choose their high school, their university and faculty or their training institution 
inside and outside national borders and to enable them to pay for it. There is no 
need any more to balance incoming and outgoing numbers of students, to have 
1  See Buchanan, J. M., and N. E. Devletoglou: Academia in Anarchy, New York 1970, Chapter 2.
2  Lith, Ulrich van: Der Markt als Ordnungsprinzip des Bildungsbereichs, in: Zukunftsprobleme der 
Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Verhandlungen auf der Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik, 
Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften in Nürnberg 1980, p. 383, and Der Markt 
als Ordnungsprinzip des Bildungsbereichs - Verfügungsrechte, ökonomische Efﬁzienz und die 
Finanzierung schulischer und akademischer Bildung, Munich 1985, pp. 127 sub. Most recently 
see also Lith, Ulrich van: Die Ordnung des Bildungswesens, Problemzonen seiner ordnungsö-
konomischen Gestaltung, Argumente der Freiheit, Bd. 14, Liberales Institut der Friedrich-Nau-
mann-Stiftung, Berlin 2005, pp. 11 sub.
3  Watrin, C.: Studenten, Professoren und Steuerzahler, Die Gruppenuniversität in ökonomischer 
Sicht, and van Lith, U.: Gruppenuniversität: Den Beweis schuldig geblieben, both in: Bildungs-
politische Studien Nr. 3, Institut für Bildungs- und Forschungspolitik, Cologne 1984.
4  In the shape of mercantilism it is even of concern to the US. See e. g. Stephen Joel Trachtenberg: 
The future and the present-day problems of education: An American perspective, in: Wissen 
wozu? Erbe und Zukunft der Erziehung, Europäisches Forum Alpbach 1997, ed. by Heinrich 
Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein, Vienna 1998, pp. 121-130.
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special programmes for exchange, etc. The market and its participants would do 
it, if nation states learn to distinguish between their function they exercise as 
providers of school and university education and their function as ﬁnanciers of 
the individual‘s investment in it.
National education systems, their parts and elements would be put under a 
sound pressure to act and to react, to be student- and trainee-oriented, to look 
more precisely at what the labour market, what employers need, what position 
the individual can attain. It makes it possible to them to compete for students 
from all parts of Europe and to be rewarded by funds that come with the student 
or trainee. Why should English and French universities not take German students 
just after they have completed their 12th grade to make them start their undergra-
duate studies, not waiting until they have passed their Abitur. Why should these 
universities not set up subsidiaries to recruit students beyond national borders, 
why not take advantage of a beautiful landscape and healthy climate to attract 
students from less favourable regions? Should this be restricted to those who can 
pay both, taxes at home and fees abroad, or those whose parents can afford it? 
Why should the others be compelled to attend their school or university at home 
where costs may be higher? Why should schools and universities not reduce 
their costs by recruiting cheaper but equally or even better qualiﬁed teachers 
from ‚abroad‘, to teach English or French or Italian as a foreign language, or to 
promote the understanding of different cultures and ways in which people think 
and live in various European regions? 
Why don‘t we take this secular chance in Europe to respond to the global chal-
lenge by turning our national monopolies into competing systems for the best of 
our young generation, a generation which has to cope with enormous structural 
and technical change under conditions that make new scientiﬁc knowledge avai-
lable at nearly any location on earth, under conditions that no longer protect it 
from competition from emerging countries, countries that have set up their own 
education and research systems and which have highly motivated young people. 
We owe our young generation increased competence and quality orientation in 
our schools and universities instead of distributing rents to the established parties 
(teachers‘ and professors‘ union) within the existing national systems. We have 
to take Karel van Miert as an example, to ﬁght against monopolistic power and 
mercantile thinking, we have to tear down protectionist walls.
To initiate a shift to demand-side ﬁnance 
of education and training
An effective way to do it - and this is the second much more difﬁcult step - is 
(1) to switch the system of education ﬁnance to a demand-side ﬁnanced system 
and (2) to distinguish between ﬁnancing education (i. e. to solve the problem of 
so-called capital market deﬁciencies in ﬁnancing investment in education) and 
state subsidies to education. The latter are state interventions into the educati-
on and training market to reduce deﬁciencies of this market, i. e. deﬁciencies in 
the provision of special, socially desirable educational goods the production of 
which is for what reason so ever too low, crime reducing educational measures 
in certain suburban areas, for example. These interventions have nothing to do 
with the ﬁnance of education and training, i. e. ﬁnance of investment in human 
capital and the functioning of the capital market. 
The guideline of thinking and action must be: All Governments should be more 
interested in the best education of their citizens than in running their education 
systems themselves. It means they have to set up rules, supervise the market and 
competition on it, to be on the side of parents, students and trainees to protect 
them against false information, fraud and market power on an European educa-
tion and training market. It means further to make provisions that citizens can 
ﬁnance their education and training on this European wide market or even abroad 
according to their individual choice.
What measures should be taken to do this? 
A potential starting point: facilitate the use of the  
capital market for investment in education and training
A potential point of departure could be what we observe already in certain coun-
tries within the European Union and outside when investment in training has to 
be ﬁnanced: Quit often companies not only train and retrain their employees at 
their costs, but also pre-ﬁnance these costs when training costs exceed beneﬁts 
(returns from productive work) during the training or contract period. They do this 
because they expect pre-ﬁnanced costs including calculated interests to be co-
vered and exceeded by future (hard and soft) beneﬁts they gain from their skilled 
and qualiﬁed employees. In other words, companies are willing to pre-ﬁnance 
training, to give unqualiﬁed ‚hidden‘ loans to their trainees. Banks would not do 
this, give loans to trainees except to their own ones. Companies do it, because 
they know more about the personal characteristics of their trainees than banks. 
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They know what skills and competencies they need to be successful on the product 
market, they can judge quite well whether a trainee will ﬁt into the company or 
not, whether he will be able and willing to acquire the skills and competencies 
required and to use them. This is why companies are willing to play the role of 
banks to trainees. And this is why banks and other suppliers on the capital market 
do not go into this business. Companies use their informational advantage to take 
over this original banking function. Sometimes companies even go on the capital 
market to borrow extra money to lend it to their employees for human capital 
investment, or they increase their equity for this purpose. Eventually, investment 
in high skilled labour is more and more important in times of rapid technologi-
cal and structural change and less costly that high wages caused by shortages in 
skilled and highly qualiﬁed labour. 
In Germany, e. g., the volume of pre-ﬁnanced costs or ‚hidden loans‘ of com-
panies to their trainees (apprentices only) is estimated to average at about Euro 
8 700 per year and trainee, i. e. Euro 14.7 billion for the economy as a whole 
(2000 estimate)5.
It is said that this informational advantage used for steering and controlling 
investment in vocational education and training is what Germany makes so suc-
cessful in training and qualifying its labour force - take aside the disadvantages 
it has through its highly state-regulated dual vocational training system making 
it difﬁcult to be ﬂexible enough for rapidly altering demands of skills and changes 
in required competencies. If the trained employee wants to leave the company 
to work with another one, the new employer takes over the loan from the former 
and reimburses him. The trainee now owes repayment to his new employer, if he 
is not willing to cancel his debt.
National states or agencies just have to protect the individual against certain 
risks of unemployment, sickness, invalidity, dead. And the measure the European 
Union has to take is to give guarantees in those cases where individuals chose 
schools and faculties across EU-internal borders or move from one company to 
another across these borders. They could do this in co-operation with national and 
international institutions which are or might be interested to be part of a European 
wide guarantee system, like public and private banks and insurance companies.
The same idea can apply to schools and universities and their faculties who 
know their students quite well. But while companies are interested in good  trai-
ning, since their competitiveness depend mainly on their qualiﬁed employees, 
state-owned schools and universities are mostly not, since they do not depend 
on their students and what they will become, whether they will be successful and 
the investment in them proﬁtable for them and at the same time for society in 
the sense that costs are at least covered by tangible and intangible beneﬁts. This 
changes immediately, when schools and universities are run as independent proﬁt 
or non-proﬁt-institutions under competitive conditions, depending on the money 
they earn when parents or students choose them and being obliged to report on 
their activities and on what happens to their students when they have left school 
or university. Though the Netherlands have already moved in this direction and a 
number of German Länder ﬁnance a citizen‘s school education by an earmarked 
amount of money per capita and school year when he or she attends a private 
school, this needs general consent between national states to ﬁnance the educa-
tional demand of the individual instead of the institution and to do this without 
regard of the territory (administrative boundaries) on which the school or faculty 
is situated. The ﬁnancial function of the state must be regarded as separate from 
the state‘s ownership of schools and universities and be separated from it insti-
tutionally. It would be advantageous if the ﬁnancing system is not (direct) part 
of the state budget, but a function exercised by a paraﬁscus or a consortium of 
banks in the name of the state. It is necessary that those who want to attend a 
school or an institution of higher education abroad are able to transfer an amount 
of money averaging the costs per capita to the school or university of their choice 
through a drawing right on a paraﬁscus, a voucher, a „Kindergeld-“ or „Bildungs-
geld“ or a payment which is fully deductible of the citizen‘s or his/her parent‘s tax 
bill or even reimbursed if this amount is higher than the income tax to be paid, a 
negative income tax or „Bürgergeld“6.
5  Beicht, U., u. Walden, G.: Wirtschaftliche Durchführung der Berufsausbildung, Untersuchungser-
gebnisse zu den Ausbildungskosten der Betriebe, in: Berufsbildung in Wissenschaft und Praxis, 
6/2002, p. 42. See further information in: Berufsbildungsbericht 2004, Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Forschung, Berlin 2004, pp. 107 sub.
6  Werner, Horst: Bürgergeld: Ein integriertes Steuer- und Transfer-System, Ed. by Liberales Institut 
der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Potsdam o. J. (2003).
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